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there is still a huge amount to do to get even the basics right - for example, how do you check real-time on a call, or at least soon after if you suspect you are being called by a police or bank  impersonator?

The Nexus specs state that liquidity provision is the responsibility of the FX providers - so the most challenging part of cross-border payments is out of scope of the scheme! 

This may be designed to goad the UK banks into action, but there is another way - Fintechs.

Already, the BoE has opened up access to RTGS reserve accounts for non-bank FIs with a big  impact on the expansion of the Faster Payments service and competition in retail payment services (without creating any additional systemic risk to the UK financial system).

Rather than introducing a retail CBDC, a better approach is to introduce a wholesale CBDC, which in effect is another form of reserves, managed through a shared ledger and programmable platform instead of with a RTGS - and allow Fintechs to develop their own retail payment services backed by wCBDC (excluding Big Tech to avoid concentrations of market power). Innovation will take hold rapidly.

Why doesn't the FCA use these powers to rein in the social media platforms that allow scams to be promoted on their platforms?

good initiative - what is really needed in addition is a web page displaying each time a third party accesses a bank account, toghether with the data accessed so that consumers can check how and when their data is being used and by who 

$3.1 trillion global payments revenue? That is 3% of global GDP - sounds implausibly high and inefficient for buying and selling goods and services and moving money around.

What does "unlocking" $700bn mean - is it sitting in a vault somewhere?

The reality is that payments are a commodity service in a competitive market and as infrastructure becomes more efficient through better tech, costs will come down - since these costs are the payments industry revenue, revenue will also decrease.

this is necessary only if the scammer is in another country, otherwise it would be easier to shut down or freeze the scammers account at the receiving bank if domestic?

another example of innovation driven out of the UK by regulators using money laundering as the excuse. Google's London startup campus in Bonhill Street, closed in 2021, used to have a bitcoin ATM in its cafe.

Reimbursing fraud victims is important but the metrics in the latest PSR scams report show clearly that APP fraud increases with reimbursement. If the 'victim' is an accomplice to the fraud it is very difficult to detect, while mandatory reimbursement provides an easy route to defraud banks in this way. 

Mandatory reimbursement may have the effect of forcing banks and PSPs to invest more in preventing APP fraud, but it is likely to lead to banks delaying or even suspending legitimate payments, intruding on customer privacy and impeding open banking payments.

It is surprising that the PSR has no measures in place to prevent reimbursement from being used to defraud banks and to prevent customer inconvenience. It is even more surprising that the government is doing nothing about the blatant scams on social media where 80% of APP fraud originates.

ISO20022 data = counterparty data.

This is a surveillance system.

This is why there is such strong resistance to BIS and central bank plans for CBDCs.