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2014

Bill Trueman

Director at Riskskill.com

Posts: 0 Comments: 62

Bill is Commenting on

UK Payments Association calls on new PSR chief to delay APP fraud rules

KS - I agree with previous anonymous sender. It appears that you have not thought this through. The paying customer (your ‘payor’) may not be involved - albeit often a little stupid / naive. It is often the fraudster that is imitating them. The fraudster cons the paying customer who has done nothing wrong. The paying bank does what is instructed. FOLLOW THE MONEY. The only faults are a) the fraudster motivations and dishonesty, b) the receiving banks that have opened up accounts for fraudsters without knowing who they are or where they are or being able to track them, and c) the receiving banks that make payments that are circumspect, not having proper ID and not knowing how or where the money is going, d) the receiving bank when it disburses the money to other receding banks with no responsibility, accountability or considerations of the suspicions involved, e) the receiving banks that then, hide behind the GDPR for not assisting in the investigations and showing their failings for fear of the legal liability for their failings, and f) the reviving banks for not correcting the position because they have no loss. (Worse: often they can make a profit from this by recovering funds and not repatriating the money but applying it to P&L!). Can you see the theme? This is a matter of law and regulatory rules that favour the “payor” (not really a word here). So your suggestions are NOT legally appropriate or fair to customer in the UK. Losing life-savings as a victim of a con, is not always a fair way to attribute liability. Your solution is unfair, unethical, and against the regulatory principles.

01 Jul 2024 Reply Read article

UK Payments Association calls on new PSR chief to delay APP fraud rules

Hi Jackie - surely postponement means that the sending banks (and the conned customers) end up paying for the frauds, and that the receiving banks, having a reprise from suffering the losses- will continue to allow the fraudsters to open accounts and withdraw the money from the ‘system’. it is these receding banks , as the figures have shown, that are allowing this to happen. If these receiving banks had strong AML / KYC controls, and knew their customers (fraudsters), then they would have no problems contacting them, getting the money back (100% of the money!), and/or prosecuting the offenders. 100% liability on the receiving bank would very quickly address the problem, and would tighten up AML / KYC issues. Stalling, and keeping liability with the ‘sending banks’ will allow the problem to continue. The sending banks have spent £millions in repeatedly annoying us with ‘are you sure?’ messages to no avail. And legislation is required to allow better communications. When a sending bank say to a receiving bank: ‘stop the payment to the fraudster’, ‘this is fraud - send it back’ etc; the answer is usually: ‘go away, GDPR applies’ in order to hide/protect the KYC failings. What do you think should happen? ‘Hoping’ that it will be solved when the law prevents it and the culprits (receiving banks and fraudsters gain from this - so are motivated NOT to act) is not really a viable solution. This has been the brunt of the solution for five years and has not worked.

01 Jul 2024 Reply Read article

UK Payments Association calls on new PSR chief to delay APP fraud rules

@ Ketharaman Swaminathan - this is not regulation driven - but through a voluntary code with PSR pressure and consumer / media led persuasion. *** Fraudsters should not be able to get accounts *** - it is AML globally that requires the banks to undertake proper customer onboarding: and if the did, then there would / should be no APP fraud. Or money available to claw back. Who do you think shoudl be liable? Not the conned customers, nor the paying banks that have simply complied with customer instruction. The bad boys are the fraudsters, and then the banks that have accepted the payments and then taken instructions from a fraudster to further hide the money. A FIRST PRINCIPLE is to 'follow the money' and reverse as much of the process as one can. Exchange of Bills Law and the Cheques Act details these processes as 'Conversion' in law. These are not cheques of Bill, but the principles apply that the receiving entity must operate so as not to pay the money to the wrong person (i.e. a fraudster).

11 Jun 2024 Reply Read article

UK Payments Association calls on new PSR chief to delay APP fraud rules

This is a rather a silly debate. It is a simple matter of WHO loses the money. If I as a customer of my bank ('Bank-Customer') instrut them to make a payment to a fraudster to thier bank ('Bank-Fraudster') - which bank shoudl lose. Reserach by UK payments shows that Bank-Fraudster are a small number of smaller banks. Our experiences are that, driven by UKPayments, the main 'Bank-Customer' banks have included endless "are you sure this is genuine" messages, and 'Bank-Fraudster' have continued to open accounts and disperse money for fraudsters. How and why did they open these accounts for fraaudsters? Was the identitity taken sufficient. It is about time that the losses were apportioned to the banks that were at fault: so that they can start doing their jobs properly. And the sooner the better. And why are there limits at all? Why shoudl we 'let Bank-fraudster' off-the-hook' at all. We'd go further: - 100% of all losses ought to go to the bank that let the fraudsters succeed with the fraud. - The industry body should stop pandering to all the neo banks that want to avoid proper legal customer (fraudster) onboarding due diligence and do what is right for customers. There shodul be a price to pay for cutting corners.

11 Jun 2024 Reply Read article