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Nice post.

Keen to know if the said "vast potential to improve this process" merely includes digital asset management tools and the like to improve the storage and retrieval of said bulletins and comments around them OR does it also include no / low code tools to build whatever code is required to the product systems to comply with the changes specified in the said bulletins?

PS: Not that DAMs are not useful but they've been around for decades and it's hard to believe that they can move the needle by much in the current era. Besides, they're not sensational enough in today's age of AI / ML / No Code.

I loved @ByrneHobart's take on the context of the similar PPP loans in USA, where the suspected fraud was $100B.

While those interested can read my entire thread on Twitter, here's a tl;dr: Any big spending project will have some waste. The fraud rate in USA was 3%. The corresponding figure in UK is less ~ 2.34% (1.1B/47B)

Quite possible but then, this feature won't be useful in my use case because it's very unlikely that my customer in USA will substitute the wrong suffix INC with the right suffix PVT LTD by him/herself and the payment will continue to fail. 

If ID is the problem, why didn't the existing CoP stop the scam described in Authorised Push Payment (APP) fraud grew 39% in 2021- little justice so who shot the APP Sheriff? 

I wish there was a more pleasant way to say this but, next to the alleged scammer, the alleged victim is most responsible for APP Scam, as I pointed out in my blog post entitled Fraud v Scam: Who Is Liable For Cybercrime.

Banks, TELCOs, and other parties working together will not solve this problem unless payor / alleged victim takes responsibility for his / her action. Populist measures like blanket reimbursement are not the solution - if anything, they will increase first party fraud and exacerbate the problem.

Instead of lamenting about things that don't exist, let's ask what happened to things that do exist: Technology, Responsibility, etc.

Why didn't Confirmation of Payee stop this scam from happening in the first place? At the point of initiating the payment, CoP should have warned the Payor / Alleged Victim that the Payee is not a genuine AirBnB. Why didn't it?

If it did, did the Payor ignore the warning?

Coincidentally, I just published a post in this topic earlier today:

Fraud v Scam: Who Is Liable For Cybercrime

I've heard of Quiet Quitting. As a matter of fact, you've handily given a definition of this term. 

Your post, including title, has several mentions of Quite Quitting. I've never heard this term. What does it mean?

When I pay with credit card, I get rewards, deferred payment, fraud protection and a myriad of other benefits. Why, then, would I pay with an A2A RTP like Zelle / FPS / UPI and forfeit those benefits?

Bottomline: What's in it for the Consumer with an A2A RTP?

This question does not matter in emerging markets like India (and probably Brazil) where credit card penetration is <5%, and A2A RTP like UPI is virtually the only way to make a digital payment.

But, in advanced markets like UK and USA where credit card penetration is >100%, until A2A RTPs answer the above question, they will continue to be a solution seeking a problem.

I'm amazed at the tenacity of A2A RTP providers in advanced markets to perpetually skirt the basic issue about their value proposition and blame everything else under the sun for failing to gather traction (and for deluding themselves into believing that Open Banking will move the needle.)

While on the subject, the Year 3 FPS volume projected by a bank for itself in 2008 was 2400TPS ~ 76B transactions per year. But the actual volume achieved by all banks put together in Year 13 is only 3.8B transactions per year. (Source: Finextra).

It's not that the industry didn't invest adequately in FPS but that FPS simply doesn't have that much TAM in an advanced market like UK.

Nice list.

As a provider of marketing solutions, let me add one more compelling use case of AI / ML in Fintech / Banking: Targeted Ads and Next Best Offers based on Credit Card Transaction History. Like most of the other use cases, this one can be - and has been - done without AI / ML (e.g. Cardlytics), and the role of AI / ML is to improve the efficacy of the process viz. improve conversion rates. 

Also King of Stonks, the Netflix show about the frauds and shenanigans of a German payments tech company that's not called WireCard.

There's too much "Drunk Under Lamp Post" regulation in the offing on compensating cybercrime victims. I'm guessing that lawmakers will see better sense and veto regulators' proposals to hold banks and TELCOs responsible for APP Scam, Business Email Compromise and other types of cybercrime where the payor has clearly authorized the payment, even if to the unintended payee and / or purpose.

Since it's So Hard To Catch Cybercriminals, prevention is a better remedy for the cybercrime problem, and I agree with your guidance that payors must exercise utmost caution while initiating digital payments.

As I highlighted in my comment here, was an incident when Payor Bank / SWIFT forced customer to abbreviate payee name GTM360 MARKETING SOLUTIONS PRIVATE LIMITED because of field length limitation and customer changed it to GTM360 MARKETING SOLUTIONS INC. Payment failed. 

If the same thing happens, I'm hoping that SWIFT's new Payment PreValidation service will tell the payor to change the abbreviation to GTM360 MARKETING SOLUTIONS PVT LTD before submitting it, and that the payment won't fail. If so, this is a great feature. 

On a side note, given that this new centralized verification service identifies "accounts that have been credited successfully", the claim that it's "based on anonymised data" almost sounds like an oxymoron:)