Government ID-iot Card DNA Database Back By Stealth

I have no idea what strawman ID card Dean Procter is taking aim at in his latest oblique pitch for the magic and inscrutable Transinteract.  I am not aware of any actual government DNA scheme.

I would have ignored the entire rant except for an important misrepresentation about smartcards.  He suggests that "any card reader carrying impostor" will be able to take your smartcard are make away with its contents.  This is quite wrong.  Well designed smartcards employ mutual authentication, so that the card detects what sort of reader it's been inserted into, and will only divulge information to readers that are cryptographically verified by the card. This is one of the reasons they're called smart.  You cannot stick a decent smartcard into any old reader and scan it (which of course is the fundamental point about EMV).

If Dean has examples of hackers outsmarting sophisticated cryptographic smartcards, like the FIPS-201 and the EU smart health card breeds, then let's see 'em.  Otherwise, his sweeping generalisations criticising smartcards in favour of his own secret solution are utter hyperbole.

Stephen Wilson, Lockstep Technologies.

The main comedy here is that Dean Procter presents a grab bag of unsophisticated media reports as some sort of "argument".

A number of security systems have indeed been subverted over time, almost always because of poor design in the key management. 

No, I don't remember RSA encryption being cracked.  It has never happened. If Dean is thinking of the cases of short (512 bit) RSA keys being attacked by brute force, then it's misleading or ignorant or both to call this "cracked".

And he hasn't come up with any examples of late model smartcards card like FIPS 201 being attacked. 

To borrow from former PM Paul Keating, debating smartcard security with Dean is a bit like being whipped by a piece of wet lettuce.

Stephen Wilson, Lockstep Technologies.

I fail to see how the primary concerns of individuals - that of being able to participate in the identity scheme is met by the ID-iot card.

What the card carriers don't want us to know is that they'll be absolutley useless to anyone without the reader. This means people interacting on the net, in the street will not have the privilege of being able to confirm anyone's identity, unless they have the reader which, the cheapest I could find was about $20. So the public would have to fork out another billion dollars to participate and prove their identity online?

Didn't those card carriers sell another pig in a poke a while back that cost over a billion pounds?

1. Chip and PIN card partial 'solution' that solved little, reduced one form of fraud only to see it displaced elsewhere for the moment. £1.1 Billion

2. smarter chip idiot card £4.7 Billion

3. new readers for everyone for the smarter card £800 million

I need a little help in understanding exactly how they make the world a safer place. The IRA had no trouble getting into London whenever they wanted to. How will asking potential terrorists to carry ID cards make us any safer?  Will all those Mexicans swimming the Rio Grande be all that much more stoppable carrying an IDiot card? No. The only use they could possibly be is if there was a cop on every street corner scanning every person as they came past and checking them against the database, and  better not use DNA or fingerprints.

If it weren't for the total rubbish about making us safer that we've been fed in the whole ID card debate it might be more believable. As it is it looks just like a £10million slush fest that does nothing to enhance the lives and democracy of citizens.

Tube Risk From RFIDiot chips

In fact the miss-use of these type of chips puts the lives of Britons in more danger every day. For instance - is it a good idea to label the parts of the London Tube System with RFID chips? (They put RFID chips on tube equipment and not just the escalators - in the tunnels) Would it not be possible to use these RFID devices (ie no suicide bomber required) to automatically trigger a bomb precisely at a point in the tube system where the smart chip people have conveniently placed them? There was a you-tube video where some high-school kids used a 'smart passport' to set off a 'smart-chip' detecting proximity bomb. Granted the average terrorist might not have a high school education, but they can still watch you-tube. I understand that GPS and mobiles don't work on the tube because of the risk of being used to trigger bombs (and the expense of repeaters), but to place another equally useful opportunity into the mix is beyond my comprehension.

I don't see how we 'need' these IDiot things to protect us from terrorism while the governments run around madly introducing new risks without a thought.

There isn't really much so far that I've heard that qualifies as smart. Does anyone think about these sorts of things or perhaps they're just focusing on the vendor's luncheon wine-list and their next holiday?

As far as I can see the IDiot card does little to protect the average citizen from anything and adds a whole lot more risks and costs.

Dean, you cover so much territory and mash up so many different issues, it's hard to follow.  Some of your points are certainly valid, but they have nothing to do with smartcard technology. 

To answer some of the concerns ...

"I fail to see how the primary concerns of individuals - that of being able to participate in the identity scheme is met by the ID-iot card."

It would help if you were specific about what ID card you're criticising. There are many different models in action and on the drawing board.  Malaysia, Hong Kong, Estonia, and the UK have markedly different architectures and philosophies.  Note that no ID card is on the horizon for Australia.

BTW I am no fan of ID cards generally; I agree they're not a good response to terrorism.  But I do advocate targetted use of smartcards for securing e-government services, because smartcards are the best way to deliver mutual authentication, and the best way to stop attack and replay of personal identifiers online.

"What the card carriers don't want us to know is that they'll be absolutley useless to anyone without the reader. This means people interacting on the net, in the street will not have the privilege of being able to confirm anyone's identity, unless they have the reader which, the cheapest I could find was about $20. So the public would have to fork out another billion dollars to participate and prove their identity online?"

Some of this is very silly.  DVDs too are absolutely useless to anyone without a player.  If buying a $20 card reader represents the public 'forking out billions', then what does it mean to have to buy a PC to access the Internet?  Trillions perhaps?  In any case, we're seeing smartcard readers increasingly built in to standard notebooks.  Mine has one.  Look up the new Dell e6500 which has both contact and contactless card readers as standard.

Dean then skips across a range of public safety issues:

"I need a little help in understanding exactly how they make the world a safer place. The IRA had no trouble getting into London whenever they wanted to. ... Tube Risk From RFIDiot chips ... In fact the miss-use of these type of chips puts the lives of Britons in more danger every day ... I don't see how we 'need' these IDiot things to protect us from terrorism".

There are some worthy points here, but they're lost in a bizarre mash up of RFID and government ID.  They're different beasts.  Elsewhere in his original blog, Dean chose to mix in the spectre of DNA weapons, and the risks of various encryption systems being "hacked" (some of the risks more imagined than real) and comes up with an incoherent conclusion that smartcards are no good.

What about this for a considered and consistent approach (mine):

- Government ID cards are not a quick fix for terrorism or border control

- Smartcards are good for protecting individual identity online, in applications like credit card payments, e-health, e-voting and anonymous participation in OSNs

- There is no such thing as perfect security

- But the better smartcards have a range of encryption, access control, tamper resistance and anti-copying mechanisms, which in the higher end architectures like FIPS 201 have not been defeated.

"Does anyone think about these sorts of things or perhaps they're just focusing on the vendor's luncheon wine-list and their next holiday?"

Gratuitous insults and the smug "IDiot" slogan don't lend authority to what is a very hollow criticism of smartcard technology.  And I think it's a bit rich coming from someone who has spent years grandiosely advertising his own cell phone based solution but who steadfastly refuses to reveal how it works.

Stephen Wilson, Lockstep.

If - there is an issue then do all the cards become junk?

Stephen - your last paragraph is testament to our security but misses the point about whether this card solution is a solution to anything except ensuring a cash-flow out of the public purse for a very poor return. It isn't about me or what solution I may or may not have - it is about whether the current ID card schemes actually provide any real benefits.

Finally I end with a call for honesty - if everyone needs to buy a reader to participate then why weren't the public told all the facts in the first place?

If there is an issue then do all the cards become junk?

What sort of issue?   Multi-programmable smartcards can have their firmware upgraded post-issuance to deal with bugs, and to deploy new security countermeasures as the cybercrime arms race proceeds.  In the worst case event of a fatal flaw, then smartcards can be withdrawn and a fix re-issued, as any security device.  But it's worth noting that wholesale replacement is a dramatic step that is almost always avoidable, by implementing other fixes.  Think about OTP generators: for years they've been regarded by purists as fatally flawed (in respect of Man in the Middle attack) and yet no bank has felt compelled to swap them out.  The same goes for magnetic stripe cards themselves.  Yes there is an "issue", but no, they're not all junk.

So please Dean, enough already of the woolly FUD about smartcards having "issues" and needing to be replaced.

Stephen - your last paragraph is testament to our security but misses the point about whether this card solution is a solution to anything except ensuring a cash-flow out of the public purse for a very poor return.

Dean evidently subscribes to the security-by-obscurity theory, which is totally discredited.  Good security should be vested in publicly scrutinised design, not in secrecy.  If you're a security product developer, who advances a particular solution (while rabidly criticising all others) then the onus is on you to be transparent, so independent evaluation can be done.

Finally I end with a call for honesty - if everyone needs to buy a reader to participate then why weren't the public told all the facts in the first place?

Well once again, it's hard to know what card scheme Dean is criticising. While I do strongly advocate engineering government smartcards with advanced security so they can be used by consumers for G2C and even B2C transactions, there are sadly few examples anywhere in the world where this is actually done (Estonia being a rare example).  So, if Dean is referring to the UK National ID System, then as far as I know, it is not necessary to buy a smartcard reader to "participate".  And if it were necessary, then I think this could be a very good thing, if it meant that consumers could avail themselves of improved Internet security tools. 

Stephen Wilson, Lockstep.

Dean edited his original blog insteading of adding a sequential comment, and I didn't immediately notice his new material ...

Update Stephen - Tuesday October 13th ABC 7.30 Australian ID Card by stealth. The medicare card 'morphs' into an IDiot card. Perhaps you might like to find it on the ABC site and view it.

Actually I've already studied the 7:30 Report story Dean.  You have it wrong.  While there is a lot of work to be done to define a new Medicare smartcard, initial indications are that the Rudd government -- if it goes down this path at all -- will be light years away from previous governments' flirtations with ID cards.  Health Minister Roxon has carefully and properly characterised any future Medicare smartcard as being (a) dedicated to health, and (b) not used to carry records but rather to carry health-specific identifiers.  These are some of the hallmarks of a good, privacy-enhancing smartcard, as experts in this field have long argued, including the Australian Privacy Foundation. 

Dean, there is nothing in the 7:30 Report story to suggest that the new idea is morphing into an ID card. You drop the phrase "Australian ID Card by stealth" when citing the story but that's your editorial.  There is nothing in the report about stealth or identity cards. 

Your assertion about morphing is baseless, and disregards the fresh approach to a Medicare card.  I have to say that you are either ignorant of the important details of the smartcard debate, or else you are deliberately misrepresenting what the new approach might be.

I quote you "I have no idea what strawman ID card Dean Procter is taking aim at.." Let's shorten it to your first four words - an apt quote for you -"I have no idea". Perhaps get one before you set the tone of our conversation next time.

Dean, the tone of this conversation was set long ago by you, with your hollow blustering about "IDiot" cards, and your unsubstantiated ambit claims about smartcards being flawed, especially your wild idea that the RSA algorithm has been "hacked".  Then you mangle my words to say that I have "no idea", in a continuation of your own abusive tone.

I've been trying to raise the tone.  Without getting personal, I've been trying to set the record straight on a couple of specific misrepresentations or misunderstandings, such as the idea that "any card reader carrying impostor" will be able to scan your smartcard, or the underlying phobia that "smartcard" equals identity card.

If you're worried about tone, then I suggest you engage in the actual debate and stop name-calling. 

Stephen.

Where is my Mum left in this debate when the stranger knocks on the door?